The Latin American social agenda in the year 2000 by Franco, Rolando & Sáinz, Pedro
51C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 3  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 1
THE LATIN AMERICAN SOCIAL AGENDA IN  THE YEAR 2000  •  ROLANDO FRANCO AND PEDRO SAINZ




in the year 2000
Rolando Franco








Now that the 1990s have ended and a new millennium is
dawning, the low rate of economic growth, the region’s
vulnerability to international financial instability and the
limited progress made in terms of equity oblige us to reflect
on the social agenda for the future. An important role in that
agenda will continue to be played by the efforts to overcome
poverty and indigence, conditioned to a large extent by the
region’s capacity for economic change and its dynamism in
creating large numbers of jobs of higher quality in terms of
productivity and income. At the same time, in view of the
heavy burden of unfulfilled social needs that still persists, it
is essential that social programmes should use their resources
efficiently and –in order to be prepared for possible crises–
safety nets should be established to cope with periods of
recession. Those programmes must attach great importance
to the creation of human capital, taking care to improve the
present unsatisfactory distribution of education between the
social strata, which is one of the symbols of Latin America’s
social shortcomings. Education alone, however, is not
enough to overcome the lack of equity, improve income
distribution and generate a situation of social mobility which
will give sons and daughters better opportunities for material
well-being and social status than their parents had. Economic
change should take advantage of the better levels of
education achieved by creating more jobs of higher
productivity, for which purpose it will be necessary to
increase the present investment coefficients and the
procurement and dissemination of technical progress. A
better mix of labour, capital and technical progress will lay
the foundations for more inclusive and equalitarian societies.
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I
Introduction
The vulnerability of most of the countries of the region
to international financial instability, the low rates of
economic growth, the limited progress made in terms
of equity, and the dissatisfaction observable in public
opinion have modified the coordinates of the economic
and social debate under way in the region, bringing
into question some of the principles on which the pre-
vailing development models are based.
On the one hand, it has been proposed that changes
should be made in the international financial
architecture (ECLAC, 1998) in order to favour sustainable
stability and facilitate the taking of timely decisions to
forestall or handle crises (ECLAC, 1999a).
In the international debate, great concern has also
been expressed for equity,1  although it is also stressed
that macroeconomic discipline should be maintained
(Camdessus, 1996). It has been asserted that
development is something more than adjustment, and
that so far we have concentrated too much on economic
aspects, without taking due account of the social,
political, environmental and cultural aspects of society.
We should therefore go beyond financial stabilization
and address the problem of long-term growth with
equity, which is the basis for human prosperity and
progress (Wolfenson, 1998).
At the same time, in Europe a debate has arisen
about the degree of inequality which is “tolerable” in
those societies and the viable alternatives for developing
(or maintaining) protection of the most vulnerable
sectors (Giddens, 1998). In that connection, the idea of
pursuing these objectives through a “Third Way” more
or less midway between the traditional options has
gained considerable currency, at least in the media.2
In Latin America, for its part, the optimism of the
early 1990s has been lost. The successive crises led to
an economic growth rate below that of other eras. It
may be recalled that in the early 1970s the regional
product was growing at around 6% per year, but towards
the end of that decade the growth rate had gone down
to 1.5%, and it fell to zero with the crisis of the 1980s.
In the first half of the 1990s there was an encouraging
recovery, with growth reaching 3% and attaining a peak
of 5.3% in 1997, only to fall back in 1998 to 2.5%. In
1999 growth was negative in most of South America,
and it recovered only feebly in 2000. Another point of
concern in the region is that this slow growth is not
generating sufficient good-quality jobs to give
employment to those entering the labour force,
especially young people and women. This has been
reflected in signs of dissatisfaction among the public,
loss of interest for political activity in some cases, and
criticisms of the way the political parties and
governments operate.
In view of such a legacy of the 1990s, it is worth
reflecting about the issues that form part of the social
agenda in Latin America and will mark the first years
of the new century.
1
 Good social policies are called for, because without them
globalization and democracy would lose legitimacy. It is
recommended that social safety nets should be established, that
agrarian reform should be carried forward, that equality of
opportunities should be promoted, and that extreme inequalities
of income distribution should be reduced through fair transfers of
income from the richest sectors to the neediest, from the healthy to
the sick, and from those who have jobs to those who have not
(Camdessus, 1996, p. 35).
2
 Various different approaches have been proposed. A broad group
of world political leaders seem to coincide with the supporters of
the “Third Way”, who seek to combine the social-democratic
contributions of the period dubbed “the glorious thirties” with the
recognized advantages of the market. There are social democrats
who are reluctant to support these changes, however, while some
analysts, who consider that “social-democratic ideas do not make
sense [at present], because they correspond to the return to power
of trade unionism, which is at present on the retreat all over the
world” but at the same time feel that the new “social liberalism”
represents a centre-right alliance between the State and economic
forces, propose instead a “2½” alternative in which the State gives
greater weight to social pressures (Touraine, 1998). Other sectors
also seem disposed to adopt renewed perspectives, as in the United
States, with the idea of “compassionate conservatism” (Olasky,
2000), which was adopted by one of the presidential candidates
(one of whom wrote the foreword to the book in question), and in
the region itself, with the efforts to construct a “reformist centre”.
Mention should also be made of some points of coincidence which
go beyond political traditions (Blair and Aznar, 2000).
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II
The present social situation
1. Poverty and indigence
According to measurements made by ECLAC, the
incidence of poverty in Latin America went down from
41% to 36% between 1990 and 1997, thus returning to
a level similar to that prevailing before the debt crisis.
Indigence evolved in a similar manner, going down
from 18% to 15% over the same period (ECLAC, 1999b).
The 1998-1999 crisis increased the proportion of poor
people in some countries and caused a slackening in
the favourable tendency previously observed in some
others, so that the decade closed with nearly 38% of
households under the poverty line and 16% in a state
of indigence (ECLAC, 2000).
As a result, whereas the reduction in poverty in
the first part of the 1990s made it possible to stabilize
the number of poor persons, the impact of the
subsequent crisis caused the number of poor to rise to
nearly 220 million and the number of indigent persons
to increase from 93.4 million to nearly 100 million
(ECLAC, 2000).
Two conclusions may be drawn from what
happened in the region in these years. Economic
growth can be said to have had a positive impact on
the reduction of poverty, although the degree of
reduction depends on the particular growth profile,
while the regressive impact of the episodes of
recession on poverty reduction is also clear: one year
of recession caused the loss of between 50 and 100%
of the advances made in this respect in four or five
years of growth.
2. Employment and unemployment
Towards the end of the 1990s, not only did growth
slacken but there were also increases in open
unemployment and in the percentage of non-permanent
wage earners and the number of workers without
employment contracts and without social security
(ECLAC, 2000, pp. 49-53 and 95-102).
In 1999 the average rate of open unemployment
in the region (8.7%) was the highest in the decade,
even though the rate of participation in the labour force
had gone down from 58.5% to 57.9%. Two different
situations should be distinguished in this respect,
however: while Mexico and some Central American
and Caribbean countries registered appreciable
economic buoyancy and a decline in unemployment,
the latter indicator increased in the South American
countries, which had problems of economic
stagnation. The phenomenon was particularly notable
in Chile, where the unemployment rate rose from 6.4%
in 1996 to 9.8% in 1999 (ECLAC, 2000, p. 95) and
continued to rise in the year 2000, reaching 10.6%. A
similar trend was observed in Argentina, although it
was not so marked, since although the product went
down by 3% unemployment only increased from
12.9% to 14.3%.
There were also significant changes in the
organization of work, which was marked by an increase
in precarious employment. Labour deregulation was
further increased through the reduction of labour costs,
more short-term hiring (temporary, seasonal or part-
time work), the broadening of grounds for the
termination of contracts, the reduction of severance
payments, and the restriction of the right to strike, all
with the aim of maintaining or increasing economic
competitiveness at the international level.
There has thus been an increase in non-permanent
employment, although to very varied levels ranging in
1997 from 9.5% in Costa Rica to 45.1% in Ecuador,
with extreme rates of increase in Colombia, where it
rose from 6.6% in 1980 to 20.0% in 1997. This type of
temporary employment is most common in micro-
enterprises and among persons under 30, women and
people of low educational level (Martínez and Tokman,
cited in ECLAC, 2000, p. 99).
There was also an increase in the number and
proportion of those with jobs but without any
employment contract. In 1996 the proportion of wage-
earners in this situation ranged from 65% to 22%,
depending on the country. Such precarious employment
was naturally linked with lower wages and greater
vulnerability and poverty.
A substantial proportion of workers did not have
social security or health protection. There are notable
differences between countries in this respect: over 60%
of workers lack such protection in Bolivia and Paraguay,
whereas almost all workers are covered in Uruguay
(ECLAC, 2000, p. 101).
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3. Income distribution
During the 1980s, governments centered their attention
on economic growth and the relief of poverty, assuming
that for this purpose it was sufficient to recover the
macroeconomic balances, end inflation, do away with
the presence of the State in certain areas and expand
the spaces open for the private sector. Many of those
who advocated these policies thought that in the long
term the trickle-down effect would put an end to
poverty. Improvement of income distribution was not
an objective in itself because it was believed that
measures to promote this could affect both economic
growth and the possibility of reducing poverty through
such growth.
Today, income distribution has gained political
importance once more, both because economic growth
does not generally seem to have led to better distribution
and because the economic debate has taken up the
question of income distribution once again, relating it
with three important issues.
A first line of analysis has taken up once again the
theory that more equalitarian income distribution
promotes economic growth, in contrast with the
argument that –at least in the first phases of the
development process– income should be concentrated
in certain groups that have the capacity to save and
invest. Doubts have also been expressed as to whether
the higher-income groups in the region have this
capacity, in view of the propensity to consume that they
usually show (ILPES, 1999, pp. 15-19).
A relation has also been traced between income
distribution and poverty. The argument in this respect,
which is of a mechanical nature, holds that there is now
“unnecessary” poverty in Latin America (Berry, 1997),
because if the income distribution of the early 1980s
had been maintained, the increase in poverty as a result
of the crisis would have been 50% smaller (Londoño
and Szekely, 1997).
Finally, it is held that the reduction of inequalities
increases the stability of democratic political systems,
whereas concentration gives rise to greater risks, due
to the reaction of losing groups seeking to improve their
inferior position.
Income distribution in Latin America in the 1990s
may be analysed through the following indicators:
i) the percentage of households with an income below
the average for the society in question rose from
67% to 75% between 1970 and 1990 and remained
at that level throughout the 1990s. This indicates
that the evolution of average income does not
adequately reflect what is happening in three-
quarters of the Latin American population;
ii) the Gini coefficient indicates that between 1990
and 1997 inequality increased in seven countries
and went down in only four (ECLAC, 1999b). It may
be recalled that Latin America is the region with
the worst income distribution in the world, although
it should be noted that it is a heterogeneous set of
nations which are very different from each other
in this respect, with Brazil and Uruguay at the two
extremes (ECLAC, 1998, pp. 216-217, table 23);
iii) the ratio between the income of the richest 10% of
the population and the poorest 40% increased
between 1990 and 1997 in seven countries and went
down in only four (ECLAC, 1999b, pp. 64 and 66).
It may be concluded, then, that even in the best of cases
the form of economic growth that has prevailed in the
region in recent years has done nothing to reduce the
inequalities that have traditionally been characteristic
of the area. However, “these problems are not a result
of the present development model, since they were also
typical of the preceding and even earlier models. They
thus reflect fundamental problems of the economic and
social structure which we should not try to conceal”
(Ocampo, 2000, p. 125).
This tendency towards inequality does not seem
to be peculiar to Latin America. It is also found even in
the developed world, albeit with other levels of
concentration. In the United States, for example, several
analysts have noted that information technologies
increase the employment and income opportunities for
“symbolic analysts”, which is the term used to denote
highly-qualified workers engaged in the production of
non-material knowledge-intensive goods (Reich, 1993).
In contrast, assembly-line workers are affected by the
increasing requirement that they should have
qualifications in informatics and the fact that companies
are transferring their routine production processes to
other countries (Thurow, 1992). Likewise, in the
European Community notable differences have been
observed between the incomes of the better-off sectors
of the population, which are increasing significantly,
and the employment possibilities, type of employment
and wages of the bottom 40% of the population
(Dahrendorf, 1996, p. 44).
These characteristics of the world economic
system, which are due in part to the incorporation of
new technologies, are compounded in Latin America
by specific factors which explain the concentration of
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income distribution and make it less easy to modify in
the short term.
ECLAC (1998) identifies four factors which are
particularly important in this connection:
i) Wealth: The distribution of wealth in Latin America
is even more concentrated than that of total income.
On average, income from wealth stands at
percentile 85 (ECLAC, 1998, figure 4), which means
that 85% of the Latin American population have
less access to wealth than the average level for
society as a whole.
ii) Demography: Lower-income households have
more members (five or more persons on average)
than households in the upper income levels.
iii) Employment: Employment density –that is to say,
the number of employed persons in relation to the
total number of persons in the household– is
particularly important for explaining what is
happening with regard to income distribution. In
some countries, the upper strata register values of
this indicator which are twice those of the lower
strata. In view of the importance of labour income
in total household income, this disparity explains
much of the high degree of income concentration.
The distance between those in the first income
distribution decile and those in the bottom 40% is
also increased by the growing disparity between
the wages paid in modern occupations and those
paid in low-productivity jobs.
iv) Education: Income distr ibution is also
conditioned by education. Although the amount
of schooling has increased over the last 25 or 30
years, so that the new generations have an average
of three more years’ schooling than their parents,
there is still a high degree of concentration of
educational capital.
4. Social expenditure: a neglected “window of
opportunities”?
After the reduction in public social expenditure which
took place in most of the countries in the 1980s, there
was a significant increase in this expenditure during
the 1990s. Thus, between 1990-1991 and 1996-1997 it
grew by 38% for the region as a whole: twice as fast as
the per capita product, and exceeding the historical peak
levels in three-quarters of the countries. This tendency
appears to have continued up to the end of the decade,
although we will have to wait for the publication of the
ECLAC Social Panorama of Latin America 2000-2001
for the official figures.
However, full advantage has not been taken of this
“window of opportunities”, which accompanies the
“demographic bonus”3  enjoyed by the region. It is
worth stressing that spending a lot does not necessarily
mean spending well, so that one of the pending tasks is
to increase the efficiency, efficacy and impact4  of such
resources: a particularly important consideration in a
region where the percentages of GDP devoted to public
expenditure are markedly lower than those of the
developed countries.
It should also be noted that the margin that
governments have for continuing to expand their public
social expenditure faster than their economic growth
rates is increasingly small. Keeping up the present levels
of public resources for social programmes is a current
challenge.
5. Public dissatisfaction
In the early 1990s, Latin Americans were mainly
concerned about the inflationary processes that were
eroding their income, and governments that were
successful in stabilizing the economy received support
at the polls (Mora and Araujo, 1992). Only a few sectors
(especially public-sector employees) reacted negatively
to their relative losses of income and benefits (ECLAC,
1995). The rest of the population wagered on the future
in the hope that they would eventually receive their
share of the fruits of growth.
Today, however, uncertainty prevails. The
economic and social situation already described has
helped to dilute hopes and in many cases has brought
to the surface the population’s weariness with the
ongoing adjustment. Opinion surveys carried out in 16
countries reveal that approximately 67% of those
3
 The expression “demographic bonus” seeks to express the ad-
vantage that the Latin American region is enjoying because its
population growth rates have slowed and there has therefore been
an increase in the proportion of adults within the total population,
which should in theory reduce the dependency rate (ECLAC/CELADE,
1996).
4
 Efficiency measures the relation between the cost of a project
and the products (goods or services) delivered by it. The objective
of efficiency analysis is to find the alternative that minimizes the
cost per unit of product. Efficacy reflects the extent to which the
production targets of the project have been attained over a given
period of time, independently of the costs incurred. The impact,
for its part, expresses the size of the benefits received by the target
population in line with the objectives of the project: for example,
the percentage reduction of grade 1 and 2 malnutrition achieved in
the target group by a project having this objective (see Cohen and
Franco, 1992).
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interviewed consider that the current distribution of
wealth is unjust, and 61% consider that their country is
not developing (ECLAC, 1998).
Obviously, those opinions are strongly based on
the personal experience of those expressing them. Those
who form part of the rising sectors or are emerging
from a state of poverty do not feel the same as the
members of currently impoverished middle-class
sectors, who compare their present standard of living
with that which they had in the past.
There are also generational differences. The present
generation feel that they have fewer opportunities than
the generation which preceded them or that which will
follow them (Latinobarómetro, 2000, p. 11).
It is very common for young people to express
dissatisfaction at the difficulties they face in finding a
job in line with their aspirations. It may be noted that
this perception does seem to have a strong basis in fact,
especially as regards the evolution of the labour market
and the difficulties micro-enterprises and small
enterprises experience in operating properly.
There is a notable similarity between the
percentage of dissatisfied young people (between 49%
and 63%, according to surveys made in seven countries)
and the percentage of persons who have not received
an education which ensures them some degree of social
mobility through proper integration into the labour
market5  (between one-third and half). It could be said
that these young people with insufficient educational
capital become aware at an early age of how
predetermined and limited the sequence of opportunities
for greater well-being will be for them in the course of
their working life (Gerstenfeld, 1998).
In Chile –where the economic reforms have
matured more than in other places and high growth rates
have been attained– there is growing concern over
inequality, which has tended in this respect to take the
place of the view of poverty as a lack of resources.
“This change means that the population is paying
particular attention to the different rates at which the
benefits of economic progress reach different sectors
of our society” (Manzi and Catalán, 1998, p. 555).
Those interviewed in the lower and middle sectors
consider that the current levels of poverty and inequality
are not in keeping with the growth achieved. They feel
that this inconsistency is due to the dynamics of the
system itself and to the policies of the social actors with
decision-making power, whom they criticise for their
lack of sensitivity. They also call for a more active role
on the part of the State (ibid., p. 532).
The perception of inequality and lack of
opportunities causes citizens to gradually lose
confidence in politicians and institutions and to abandon
the political parties (Manzi and Catalán, 1998). They
draw away from political activity, which they no longer
see as a means for defending their group interests and
helping to create a society where social distances are
kept down to a reasonable level. They do, however,
support democracy as the best system of government,
although they do not feel a similar degree of satisfaction
with the way it works, because of the high expectations
that they had in the capacity of democracy to solve their
problems. In fact, only 37% of Latin Americans are
satisfied with the performance of democracy
(Latinobarómetro, 2000, p. 6).
It must be acknowledged, however, that any
process of development means sparking off various
demands. Even when there is economic growth and
social progress in the satisfaction of basic needs
(drinking water, electricity, rural roads), opinion polls
will not necessarily reflect satisfaction. Maslow’s theory
that the satisfaction of some primary necessities means
the immediate appearance of other strongly felt needs
(Maslow, 1954) may go some way towards explaining
the discontent felt on account of the appearance of new
expectations and aspirations.
5
 That is to say, an education longer than that of their parents (mak-
ing allowance for “educational devaluation”) which enables them
to cross the minimum threshold for proper incorporation into the
labour market.
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III
Emerging social issues
In a situation like that described above, a fundamental
element on the Latin American agenda in the coming
decade will be the building of more equalitarian soci-
eties, which means incorporating large percentages of
the population into the consumer society and creating
channels that promote social mobility.
1. Integration into the consumer society
In Latin America, most households do not have
sufficient income to reach a minimum level of mass
consumption. This is a dimension not only of material
well-being, but also of status and integration, which
are increasingly prized by society. Even so, there are
circles which keep on denouncing what they call
“consumerism”, which they see as a departure from
certain cultural patterns, due to the demonstration effect
of adopting fashions felt to belong to other social strata
and other countries.
In general, only two or three out of every ten urban
households currently have a level of per capita income
sufficiently high to bring them into the consumer society
by Latin American standards.6  In rural areas the
situation is even more unfavourable. In Uruguay, about
half the households qualify for the consumer society,
but in the other countries only a third are in this position.
According to an optimistic hypothesis, only Argentina
and Chile could join the group of Latin American
countries with over half their households integrated into
the consumer society between now and 2005
(Gerstenfeld, 1998).
It is probably the members of these urban
households which are not poor but do not have sufficient
income to enter the consumer society fully who are
most responsible for the feeling of frustration recorded
in surveys (Gerstenfeld, 1998).
Sustained economic growth is undoubtedly the
means by which the broad masses could be integrated
into consumer society.
2. Social mobility
A modern, open society with a concern for equity
should be marked by smooth and easy social mobility.
One way of ensuring that the social roles operate cor-
rectly is that there should be possibilities and incen-
tives for rising to positions which are better paid or are
of higher status. In traditional societies, in contrast, roles
are assigned basically through principles of entitlement
whereby these positions are reserved by birth.
In the first phases of development there is a kind
of “structural” mobility under which new higher-level
positions are rapidly created and filled by anyone who
has the necessary training for carrying out these
functions. In more advanced phases, mobility becomes
a “circular” process: not so many new positions are
generated, and change must take place through rotation:
that is to say, through the departure of some of the
occupants of higher positions (by retirement, death or
termination) and their replacement by persons with
suitable qualifications for the job (Pastore and Silva,
2000, p. 5).
Studies show that only two out of every four urban
young people and only one out of every four rural young
persons have had educational mobility. It may therefore
be concluded that the probability of social mobility has
remained practically unchanged since 1980 (ECLAC,
1998). The possibility of changing this pattern is closely
linked with the educational system.
It should be noted here that a society based on merit
–a “meritocracy”–, in which positions are occupied by
those who have certain capabilities, may doom those
who do not have those capabilities to exclusion and
poverty. This justifies the argument that it is necessary
to incorporate an element of solidarity to make up for
this lack.
3. Towards more equalitarian societies
Great stress is usually laid on the economic aspects of
inequality. Latin American experience shows that even
in those countries which have managed to comply with
6
 In order to be integrated into consumer society, a household per
capita income greater than three poverty lines is needed. At this
point, the distribution displays a clear upward jump in the level of
expenditure. It may be recalled that one poverty line naturally
represents a situation of poverty, while having an income of up to
two poverty lines represents a situation of vulnerability and a risk
of suffering poverty at some stage in life.
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the recommendation to keep up growth rates of 6% per
year, there is no improvement in income distribution,
nor are there any differences with regard to the degree
of public satisfaction over what is happening. There is
therefore a clear “need to give special attention to
economic and social policies which have a direct
incidence on aspects of a distributive nature, especially
in those areas where there is the greatest sensitivity over
inequality (education, housing and health)” (Manzi and
Catalán, 1998, p. 555). Likewise, the new intellectual
concern with income distribution already referred to
has identified relations which appear to show that
greater equality in this respect is even preferable for
securing higher growth.
While this aspect is very important, it should also
be noted that the concern to build more equal societies
goes beyond economic matters and material well-being.
Other forms of equality, without which a good society
cannot exist, are also important.
Such advances in the satisfaction of basic needs
entail monetary costs which must be met by the
beneficiaries, and this is difficult when there has not
been an increase in the productivity of the backward
sectors in question and there are no new employment
options to support the advances made.
An equalitarian society goes beyond consensus on
the most crucial economic elements, however. Firstly,
equality is a prior requisite for the proper functioning
of the market itself. This is so, for example, in the case
of equality before the law, which, although enshrined in
the Constitutions of Latin America, is far from prevailing
in practice. The reforms being made in systems of justice
represent an acknowledgement of the shortcomings
which exist in the region in this respect. Another essential
requisite is equality of opportunity, understood as the
elimination of the disadvantages faced by some persons
due to the existence of certain barriers or restrictions or
the impossibility of gaining access to certain media.
Equality of opportunity means doing away with the
connections which exist between the possibilities of
well-being and some personal characteristics which it
is impossible or extremely difficult to change (sex or
race, for example) or which derive from the fact of
having been born into a family with certain attributes
(socioeconomic level, caste, etc.).
In the final analysis, even when freedom is the main
priority it is necessary to ensure that there is equality
of freedom, that is to say, to display equal concern, at
all levels, for all the persons involved (Sen, 1999, p. 7).
It is also necessary to promote equality of freedom
of expression. In any country there are undoubtedly
many differing views on how to organize society, and
all persons, communities and groups must be
guaranteed the right to express their preferences and
organize themselves to promote them within the
democratic debate.
Many of these principles are of fundamental
importance for the proper functioning of democracy.
The principle of “one man, one vote” must be respected
if democracy is to work. There must be equality of
citizenship. Although we talk about the “political
marketplace” we cannot permit the (economic) market
to determine political decisions. We must ensure that
“although people may have different weight and
importance in the market as a function of what they
own, they must all have the same weight and importance
when it is time for them to exercise, as citizens, their
civic and political, social and occupational, value-linked
and ideological rights” (Hardy, 2000).
Equality of rights as citizens means that differences
in personal status do not lead to privileges for some but
exclusion for others.
In the field of society and culture, it is also
necessary that there should be equality in diversity: that
is to say, that individuals, communities and groups of
different types should have the possibility of developing
their own views of the different dimensions of human
behaviour and thus be able to live their differential ways
of life, resulting in cultural pluralism.
Growth also depends, however, on social policies
insofar as these form the human capital which will be
mobilized to permit the proper functioning of the posts
needed in order to make the economic system work.
Social policies also help to create the political conditions
needed in order to give rise to the stability required for
investment and the execution of productive projects.
4. Responsibility of public policies
Public policies will undoubtedly be one of the key
instruments for tackling the social agenda of the end of
the century. A good economic policy also has positive
social effects. It creates suitable conditions for the
generation of employment and good wages, and even
when the jobs created are of low productivity and
wages, as has mainly been the case in recent years, this
allows a larger number of members of poor households
to find employment, thus increasing the occupational
density of households and hence also their per capita
income. Economic growth also facilitates increased
public spending, with its potential for improving equity
and reducing poverty in the short and long term.
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It should be borne in mind, however, that “the
sensitivity of the region’s growth to international
financial cycles continues to be as marked as ever,
despite the growing sophistication of macroeconomic
management” (Ocampo, 2000, p. 122). This makes it
essential to try to reduce the impact of such cycles on
the population in general and its less protected sectors
in particular. Moreover, the growing segmentation of
the labour market calls for policies designed to prevent
relative prices from affecting the hiring of labour; to
ensure ongoing training of labour and prepare workers
to use new technologies, and to improve labour
legislation and establish unemployment insurance
schemes which provide workers with protection in
periods of recession and of readaptation of production.
Since the low-productivity sectors are made up of small
and micro-enterprises, which provide employment for
over half of all Latin American workers, efforts should
be made to promote the introduction of new technology
in them, by ensuring that they have access to credit and
markets, and to provide them with support in the areas
of information, product development, marketing
channels and business management.
Policies in the fields of low-cost housing and
community facilities are also vital for improving the
living conditions of the people, raising the quality of
health services and creating a suitable environment for
schoolchildren to gain the fullest benefit from
education, as well as helping to improve the distribution
of wealth. Where the proportion of rural dwellers in
the total population is still substantial, it is necessary
to facilitate the market access of producers in distant
regions by carrying out infrastructural programmes and
improving access to land and water.
With regard to social policies, they obviously
cannot be responsible for pursuing the objective of
equity unaided. Social development is not entirely their
exclusive responsibility: this task is shared with
economic policy. Social policies have a direct and
indirect influence on the reduction of poverty and
improvement of living conditions through their three
basic functions: investment in human capital, social
compensation, and social integration or cohesion.
a) Investment in human capital: education
When the main production factor is knowledge, there
are concrete reasons justifying the pursuit of greater
equity, and it is no longer necessary to use only
arguments of an ethical, philanthropic or solidarity-
oriented nature. Countries cannot be competitive if they
do not have a properly trained and educated labour force
capable of gaining access to technical progress and
incorporating it in their everyday work. Competitiveness
and equity may therefore be seen as objectives which
can be pursued simultaneously and which mutually
foster each other. Thus, from the aggregate point of
view, social policy oriented towards investment in
human capital becomes an essential prerequisite for
economic growth. The same is true of the need to train
the population in matters of health, so that they can
carry out their productive functions properly.
Education is also of key importance for individuals.
At the same time, however, it must be acknowledged
that this is an inherited asset, especially in the case of
high-quality education. Opportunities for well-being are
transmitted from one generation to another (ECLAC,
1998), so that there is a link between the household of
origin and the number of years of schooling, type of
occupation and level of well-being that its new members
will be able to attain in the course of their lives.
To begin with, the household of origin has a
fundamental role to play in the advantage taken of
schooling. There are various features of the household
which are of influence in this respect: i) its
socioeconomic level; ii) the educational climate
prevailing in it, defined as the number of years of
schooling possessed by its adult members; iii) the
housing conditions (whether there is overcrowding or
not), and iv) the form of organization of the family
(single-parent or with both parents present; the type of
union between the parents is also important).
The future of the new generations is thus defined
at an early stage, establishing a big difference between
the excluded (those whose education is insufficient to
give them a chance of occupying well-paid jobs that
will free them from poverty) and the integrated. Those
who are in the excluded sectors will not attain adequate
levels of living, and they will not be in a position to
make a contribution to competitiveness either, because
they will lack the knowledge and flexibility needed to
incorporate technical progress into their forms of
production.
In another link of the chain, educational capital is
of key importance in terms of the occupational
opportunities young people will have when they enter
economically active life, because of two closely
interlinked phenomena which must be taken into
account in policy design: educational devaluation and
the minimum educational threshold level.
Educational devaluation is the loss of importance
suffered by certain educational levels as more and more
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people reach them; it reflects the need to complete more
and more years of formal education in order to gain
access to a given occupation or obtain a similar level
of wages to that enjoyed by the preceding generation.7
Experience shows that the lower the educational level,
the greater the degree of devaluation.
The educational threshold, for its part, is the
minimum number of years of education that must be
completed at a given time in order to obtain a job which
gives a high probability (90%) of being able to avoid
poverty throughout the rest of one’s life. In Latin
America, this threshold stands in many cases at the level
of 12 years’ formal schooling (ECLAC, 1999b) and is
only reached by a third of young people in urban areas
and one-tenth in rural areas.
Finally, the occupation obtained links up with the
opportunities of future well-being, as noted in the Social
Panorama of Latin America. Those with less than eight
years’ schooling will only be able to obtain jobs that
provide them with an income around two and a half
poverty lines, which is not enough for a minimum level
of well-being. At the other extreme, those with 12 or
more years’ education will be able to work as
technicians, managers or owners of businesses, and in
these occupations they will obtain incomes over four
poverty lines. Those who are in an intermediate position
(9-11 years’ schooling) will work as salesmen or similar
types of work and will receive incomes which at certain
stages in their life cycle –when they have formed a
family and their children are reaching adolescence–may
not be sufficient to give them an adequate level of well-
being (ECLAC, 1998).
From the point of view of society, the cost of
untrained human resources which are not efficient
enough for competitive production systems may be
defined as: “the growth potential of the human capital
endowment which is not realized because of the
educational deficits which exist” (Cohen, 1996, p. 4).
Therefore, although educational reform policies
which seek to reduce repetition of grades and dropping
out and improve the quality of education are very
important, they are not of themselves sufficient to
overcome lack of equity. It is also necessary to take
into account the out-of-school factors that affect
educational performance and to make up for differences
connected with the household of origin of students, if
it is desired to prevent the educational system from
functioning as a mechanism that reproduces existing
differences.
It should be emphasized that the improvement of
education is not of itself enough to bring about changes
in income distribution in the next ten years. As the
rotation of workers in the labour force takes place at
the rate of 2% or 3% per year, the occupational profile
of 80% of those currently working will continue to
apply to the labour market until the end of the next
decade. No advantage will therefore be gained from
the improvements being made in the educational
system, which are designed to affect those who have
not yet entered the labour market.
The distribution of access to health is also
inequitable, although it must be acknowledged that
progress has been made in reducing infant mortality,
increasing life expectancy, etc. Nevertheless, there are
now new demands which will make it necessary to
broaden policies in this field and provide more modern
and diversified services, not only in preventive
activities. The reform processes carried out so far, in
which the private sector plays a significantly greater
role than in the past, have given rise to a large-scale
debate on the best way of improving efficiency and
meeting ever-increasing demands.
b) Social compensation: safety nets
The struggle to overcome poverty and indigence will
continue to be a central issue, and growing importance
is being assumed by social safety nets: that is to say,
the sets of compensatory measures which increase
income and other assets through targeted transfers and
are specifically designed to maintain or increase the
well-being of poor or vulnerable groups at times of
economic transition (Graham, 1994). It is even believed
that such measures can increase popular support for
the economic transition process, provided there is
adequate communication and the participation of those
affected is promoted by strengthening their capacity
for organization.
Safety nets must be stable, must form part of
permanent institutional systems, have specialized staff,
suitable mechanisms for determining eligibility,
portfolios of projects and established practices for their
evaluation, etc. If not, they will be unable to respond in
a timely manner to the needs for protection at times of
crisis (Cornia, 1999).
Since the 1980s, the protection of the poor at times
of crisis has been based on emergency employment
7
 This question was analysed in depth some years ago by Aldo E.
Solari and is dealt with in various ECLAC studies. It has recently
been taken up again in the press: see La Tercera (2000).
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programmes, anti-poverty programmes and social
emergency funds or social investment funds, through
which it has been sought to complement the traditional
social assistance programmes. It would also be
desirable, however, to take measures which keep up
employment, such as bringing forward planned
investments in infrastructure or promoting public works
in communities which have suffered natural disasters
or unfavourable economic situations (Iglesias,
forthcoming). The basic criterion for such programmes
should be to carry them out in a counter-cyclical
manner, expanding their coverage and benefits in
periods of recession. It would therefore be necessary
to identify those branches which should not suffer cuts
or should actually be expanded in times of crisis.
c) Social cohesion
An integrated society is one in which the population
behaves in accordance with socially accepted patterns
and there is an equilibrium between cultural goals, the
structure of opportunities for attaining them, and the
formation of individual capabilities for taking
advantage of such opportunities. There are of course
always types of behaviour which are not in keeping
with these patterns and can give rise to increases in
social cohesion or, on the contrary, processes of
disintegration usually linked with phenomena of
exclusion: that is to say, circumstances in which society
does not make available to individuals the proper means
(opportunities) for attaining the goals imposed by the
culture in question (ECLAC, 1997, chapter III, p. 73).
Concern for cohesion does not mean the pursuit
of homogenization, since a modern society must respect
people’s right to their own cultural identity and must
value diversity, together with the contributions made
by the creativity of each cultural group. Thus, while
global objectives and rules are shared, there is still room
for a wide range of other goals, both of individuals and
of groups. This is particularly important in multiracial
or multicultural societies.
The traditional problems of low levels of
integration displayed by the region (poverty and other
problems already referred to, racial discrimination,
social segmentation, residential segregation) are now
compounded by such new phenomena as various forms
of violence, citizen insecurity, drug trafficking and
corruption.
This set of situations weakens or destroys the links
of shared belongingness, the acceptance of shared
patterns of behaviour and the exercise of effective
citizenship, while at the same time strengthening
exclusive forms of particularism and generating lack
of confidence in the public order.
The improvement of social integration is thus also
linked to the recomposition of channels of social
mobility in keeping with the changes under way, the
application of a form of development whose benefits
reach all levels of society, a public environment which
recognizes and values diversity and promotes the
strengthening of the actors of civil society, and a
political system in which the demands and interests of
all the actors are represented and negotiated.
The incorporation of those who are excluded
through various types of discrimination (ethnic, sex-
based, etc.) is a task that is still to be completed, in
which affirmative action or positive discrimination are
fundamental ways of progressing in the struggle to
overcome different types of inequality due to family
origin, race or sex.8
IV
Conclusions
On the social level, the situation in Latin America at
the end of the twentieth century is not satisfactory.
Although economic growth has been restored to some
extent, it is not fast enough to improve the levels of
living of the whole population. At the same time, while
social policies have received very considerable
resources, it will not be easy to keep up this social
expenditure unless there is sustained economic growth,
and in any case there will have to be notable
improvements in the efficiency of the way such policies
8
 For example, by using positive discrimination or affirmative action
to reduce differences and inequalities, although this solution is
currently being questioned in some circles. Thus, President
Fernando Henrique Cardoso has highlighted the resistance that
exists in Brazil to a quota system for facilitating the access of
negroes to education (see Cardoso, 1998, p. 328).
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are applied, in their efficacy in reaching their objectives,
and in the impact of the programmes on the beneficiary
population.
The future agenda of the region will include the
aspiration to build more inclusive and equalitarian
societies, with increasing incorporation of hitherto
excluded strata of the population into the consumer
society and social mobility.
Emphasis must be placed on the importance of
democracy and the quality thereof. This is a basic
ingredient for a good society. Democracies of the
illiterate are not true democracies and very easily open
the way to clientism and populism. Societies with large
numbers of excluded persons also provide fertile ground
for violence and citizen insecurity and end up by
affecting the functioning of democracy itself. They lead
to a deterioration in the living conditions not only of
the poor but also of the integrated sectors, who tend to
live in fortified bunkers and to feel insecure when
moving around in their own cities, and they encourage
the development of the private security industry.
One of the debates which is going on in Europe at
present deals with the “two-thirds” society: that is to
say, a society in which only two out of every three
persons are integrated. In Latin America, however,
“one-third” societies currently predominate. The
challenge, then, is to create societies in which, as the
title of a recent book says, “Everybody’s in” (Bustelo
and Minujin, 1998). This is the challenge facing the
region, which will only be authentically competitive if
it simultaneously achieves human development.
As Dahrendorf (1996) says, “Simultaneously
achieving growth, cohesion and liberty may be difficult;
it may even mean ‘squaring the circle’, which is of
course impossible to achieve in a completely perfect
manner, but we can nevertheless come closer to it”.
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